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Abstract—Smart grid is equipped with various kinds of smart
devices such as meters, sensors, and actuators, to name a few,
and it can be characterized as the Internet of Things. The cyber
domain of this cyber-physical system also has to deal with many
cyber-threats, including the stealthy False Data Injection (FDI)
attack. This man-in-the-middle data-driven attack is extremely
dangerous due to its ability to disrupt the operation without
being detected. The unbalanced distribution network is a highly
probable target for an FDI attack due to its easy physical access.
This paper will investigate an attack design scheme based on
a nonlinear physical-constraint model that is able to produce
an FDI attack with the same theoretical stealthy characteristic.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed design scheme,
simulations with the IEEE 13-node Test Feeder are conducted.
The experimental results indicate that the false positive rate
of the bad data detection mechanism is 100%. This figurative
number opens a serious challenge for operators in maintaining
the integrity of measurement data.
Index Terms—Cyber-physical system, cyber-security threat,
distribution network, False Data Injection attack, Internet of
Things, smart devices, smart grid, State Estimation, unbalanced.
I. INTRODUCTION
FROM the early stage of development, the task of super-vising and controlling the interconnected power network
was challenged by the geographical distances. This issue has
been resolved by deploying a system of remote terminal units
(RTUs) at critical nodes. The measured values from RTUs are
sent to the control center as an input to the Energy Manage-
ment System (EMS), for state estimation (ES). The estimated
states, in turn, are the inputs for various control algorithms,
that directly affect the operation of physical systems such
as optimal power flows, contingency analysis, and economic
dispatch. Previously, only the balanced transmission system is
supervised using the linear DC-based low-accuracy SE mod-
ule. With the growth of the power sector the state estimation
requires a higher level of precision. The current information
and computer technologies (ICTs) enables the SE module
to be implemented with a sophisticated nonlinear AC-based
large-scale high-accuracy model. The increasing penetration
of distributed energy resources (DERs) such as solar or wind
farm has transformed the unbalanced distribution network into
a hybrid energy-Internet-of-Things system. Therefore, an AC-
based SE module will be deployed for the task of monitoring
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and management of distribution network. In this paper, SE
module is understood as an AC-based one.
Since the first released prototype in 1970 [1], several
research groups have already proposed various paradigms for
the SE module in the distribution network. Roytelman et al.
[2], Baran et al. [3], Meliopoulos et al. [4] and Lu et al.
[5] obtained extensive full-phase power based models. After
that, Baran et al. tried to improve the computing efficiency of
the module by introducing a current-based model [6]. Using
the same ideas about the current-based model, Wang et al.[7]
enhanced the working rate of the SE module. Along with
the breakthrough of advanced technologies, the contemporary
cyber-physical system is exposed to various cyber-security
threats that normally exist in the communication system. Since
Stuxnet [8] in 2010, the man-in-the-middle type False Data
Injection attack has been getting more and more attention due
to its devastating consequences.
Although there has been research about FDI attack against
balanced transmission system, most of works did not target
the state estimation for the unbalanced distribution network
(DNSE). Deng et al. in [9] did an extensive job to enhance
the insight of this topic, however, their scope of study is still
about balanced system. This limitation is a major concern as
the fundamental difference between the transmission system
and the distribution network is about phase balancing. Apart
from this work, almost no others address an FDI attack
against the DNSE. This gap is expected to be filled soon as
the evolution of distribution network with the integration of
distributed generation necessitates the crucial role of DNSE.
Given the fact that the distribution network is relatively more
approachable (in terms of location, i.e., closer to residential
areas), the system of meters and sensors are vulnerable to
cyber attacks. An FDI attack in distribution network is not
only feasible but also seems to be less difficult to establish
than the one in transmission system.
The adversaries have various motivations to organize an FDI
attack in distribution network. This type of attack is at utmost
level of dangerous since it is completely stealthy under all
the current examination measures equipped with SE module.
The attackers can maximize the damage to the physical
environment by a malevolent attack. A typical example for
this situation is the 2015 Ukraine blackout [10]. That incident
consists of a series of destructive actions, from phishing email
to seize the control of SCADA (cyber domain) to remotely
issuing the commands to switch off the power substations
(physical domain). Consequently, a wide-area blackout (which
was originated from the cyber domain) happened, dealing
significant damage to the physical environment. In such sit-
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2uation, the operators at the control center have very little
time to detect and respond, mostly too late to react. On the
other hands, the attacker may employ the FDI attack scheme
to gain economical advantage and benefits. For instance, he
possesses a rooftop solar structure that is able to sell energy
back to the distribution network and he wants to falsify the
selling amount to earn more money from the utility companies.
In the same manner, an electricity thief happens when the
adversaries successfully adjust the usage figure of the meter
through an FDI attack. In another case, attackers may initialize
an instability event that could make the system collapse, by
triggering the relay protective system to wrongfully trip down
certain lines due to the counterfeit over-threshold values. In
the wake of the distributed generations era, the distribution
network which is now having bi-directional power flows is
more fragile than ever before.
With such awareness about the potential threats of FDI
attack in distribution network, an in-depth investigation is
necessary. Only when can we gather comprehensive insight
about this FDI attack, we can expect to plan various strategies
to mitigate or prevent it. The major contribution of this paper
is to provide a comprehensive analysis of some possible ways
to conduct FDI attack in the smart distribution network. There
are five sections in this paper with the current one introducing
the background and relevant works. Section II discusses some
preliminary considerations that must be taken into account
while working with distribution network, as well as steps in
planning the design schemes for specific cases, and steps in
devising a dedicated SE’s results assessment method based
on the unbalanced load flow program. Section III provides a
case study with the unbalanced IEEE 13-node Test Feeder
to illustrate for the proposed attack design schemes. The
obtained experimental results are presented in Section IV,
demonstrate the theoretical stealth capability of the attack.
Finally, concluding remarks and future research trend are
highlighted in Section V.
II. FALSE DATA INJECTION ATTACK DESIGN SCHEME FOR
DISTRIBUTION NETWORK
A. Design considerations
In order to actively formulate strategies to deal with the
potential threats of the FDI attack, the worst-case scenario
must be taken into consideration. We assume that the hackers
have enough resources to organize an FDI attack, i.e., there is a
capability to collect all necessary information about the attack
region (a sub-grid of the network) including topology, status
of switches and breakers, steady-state measured values, and
also to compromise whichever critical meters that is needed
to override the measurement values. In short, the main work of
the adversaries is to concentrate on constructing a completed
set of false data that look like normal measured data from
the viewpoint of the SE module. In this paper, the focus is
on technical aspects of computing FDI attack vectors with the
ability to completely bypass the bad data detector (BDD) of
the DNSE module.
1) Models of components: Distribution network possesses
several characteristics that distinguish itself from transmission
system. It has no phase-transposing, is mostly radial in struc-
ture with the number of phases on each lateral varies from
one to three; and most importantly, it has naturally unbalanced
load. Both the representative models and analytic algorithms
applied for distribution network are much different compared
to transmission system. For instance, as the phase transposing
is not applied, the combination of “self“ and “mutual induc-
tion” into “phase induction” is no longer valid as is done for
the transmission system (which results in the line impedance
Z = R+ jX (Ω)). Instead, the computation on each quantity
must be conducted independently using Carson’s equations
[11] that result in individual self and mutual impedances (of
simplified model) presented in the matrix format as below:
Zabc =
Zaa Zab ZacZba Zbb Zbc
Zca Zcb Zcc
 (1)
2) Models of measurements: Let’s assume that digital me-
ters to collect measurement quantities (active and reactive
powers) are equipped at both the terminals of each phase
on every branch and at positions where power is injected.
Given the unbalanced characteristics of the distribution net-
work, employing per-phase representative model in designing
FDI attack is inadequate. Instead, a full 3-phase power-flow
measurement model as in Eq. (2) and (3) that includes all the
unique features of the distribution network, is employed:
P phij =
∑
l=a,b,c
V phi {V li [Gph,lij cos(θphi − θli)+
Bph,lij sin(θ
ph
i − θli)]}
−
∑
l=a,b,c
V phi {V lj [Gph,lij cos(θphi − θlj)+
Bph,lij sin(θ
ph
i − θlj)]}
(2)
Qphij =
∑
l=a,b,c
V phi {V li [Gph,lij sin(θphi − θli)−
Bph,lij cos(θ
ph
i − θli)]}
−
∑
l=a,b,c
V phi {V lj [Gph,lij sin(θphi − θlj)−
Bph,lij cos(θ
ph
i − θlj)]}
(3)
where i, j = 1, 2, ..., N with N is the total number of nodes,
and ph denotes phase a, b, or c in a distribution smart network.
G and B are real and imaginary parts of the elements of Zabc.
Observing the above formulas, all the state variables (phase
quantities: voltage magnitude V phi and voltage angle θ
ph
i ) are
included in each individual one-phase measurement (P phij or
Qphij ) computation. All the three phases in the distribution
network are coupled, which means that any change happens
in one phase will result in alterations in the quantities of the
other phases. This feature makes the attack design scheme
for distribution network more challenging than the counterpart
in transmission system since the latter one does not have to
consider that interaction.
33) Models for the State Estimation: When it comes to FDI
attack, regardless of type of system (either transmission system
or distribution network), the target is the same SE module of
the EMS package. The relationship between measurements and
state variables is given as:
z = h(x) +  (4)
where
• z: is a vector of measurements (power flows, power
injections, voltage magnitudes and angles). In distribution
network, all the measurements are phase quantities.
• x: is a vector of state variables (voltage magnitudes and
angles at every phase of each node).
• h: is a vector of nonlinear functions represent the rela-
tionship between measurement values and state variables.
• : is a vector of measurement errors which is assumed to
have Gaussian distribution with zero mean.
Given a set of acquired measurements, an SE algorithm will
iteratively solves, for instance, the most common weighted
least square optimization problem as in (5), to obtain the set
of state variables x¯:
minF(x¯) = (z − h(x¯))T ·W · (z − h(x¯)) (5)
In the above equation, W is the weighting matrix whose
elements correspond to the inverse of the individual measure-
ments’ accuracy. The existence of bad measurement data due
to various reasons is detected and eliminated by comparing
the normalized residual with a threshold τ as if:
||z − h(x)|| > τ (6)
B. Design scheme
Corresponding to linear DC-based and nonlinear AC-based
SE models, the attack models are also divided into DC-based
and AC-based attacks. The DC-based FDI attack model can
easily bypass the criterion (6) just by adding an attack vector
a that is the product of the linearized matrix H and an
arbitrary contaminated vector c to the current measurement
vector z. However, FDI attack aimed at an AC-based SE
module is far more complicated. This kind of attack targets
a specific region, called attack area. Let the whole grid be
divided into two regions: region 1 is the area under attack and
the rest of the network is region 2. The corresponding sets
of measurements, state variables and nonlinear representative
functions are {z1, z2}, {x1, x2}, and {h1, h2}, respectively.
The relationship between measurements and state variables
becomes: [
z1
z2
]
=
[
h1(x1, x2)
h2(x2)
]
+
[
1
2
]
(7)
The vector h(x) is based on physical laws such as the Kirch-
hoff’s Current Law (KCL) and the Kirchhoff’s Voltage law
(both originate from the law of Conservation of Energy), and
Ohm’s law. Any set of values zˆ which strictly complies with
the physical laws that constituted the measurement models,
is able to provide a converged solution for the optimization
problem (5). If another set of this kind exists in the proximity
of a steady state operating point, that set of measurements is
also able to bypass the examining process of the BDD.
In this paper, the above FDI attack design principle is
applied, in which the set of manipulated state variables xˆ =
{xˆ1, x2} and the set of malicious measurements zˆ = {zˆ1, z2}
will be acquired directly. A new pseudo steady state near the
genuine one is created to deceive the SE module. Because it
is a pseudo steady state, it meets the criterion (6):∥∥∥∥∥
[
zˆ1
z2
]
−
[
h1(xˆ1, x2)
h2(x2)
] ∥∥∥∥∥ < τ (8)
The above proposed method is fundamentally different
from all the previous approaches (for balanced transmission
system) in the literature. Other algorithms try to find the
contaminated vector c, the set of manipulated state variables
xˆ = {x1 + c, x2}, and the set of mixture of malicious and
normal measurements zˆ = {z1 + a, z2}, respectively in that
order. The normalized residual is qualified if:∥∥∥∥∥
[
z1 + a
z2
]
−
[
h1(x1 + c, x2)
h2(x2)
] ∥∥∥∥∥ < τ (9)
Hence, the condition for the attack being hidden is:
a− h1(x1 + c, x2) + h1(x1, x2) = 0
⇔ a = h1(x1 + c, x2)− h1(x1, x2)
(10)
Attack vector a and contaminated vector c are mutually
dependent for a successful attack. Therefore, all elements of
the contaminated vector c cannot be arbitrarily selected as
Anwar et al. claimed in [12]. In addition, this approach could
possibly produce cumulative errors due to enduring through
various computation stages.
The proposed attack design scheme in this paper has two
main stages which are illustrated in Fig. 1. The first stage is
to identify all possible attack areas. In an area of attack the
measurements are compromised. This concept was first defined
in [13], where the first condition to guarantee a successful
attack is: the attack region must be enclosed by nodes with
power injection only. This is imporant as the type of attack
area helps to allocate resources for launching attack. In the
next step the constraint-based attack model is acquired for the
attack areas from the previous stage. The output of this step is
a set of manipulated state variables of a false steady state. This
set is fed into the measurement model to compute the set of
measurements with false data injection. The relevant technical
details are presented below.
1) Attack Area: The attack area should be as small as
possible because of two reasons: (i) a smaller attack area
would require less resource to launch the attack, e.g. the
number of meters that the adversary have to compromise; (ii)
the changes in a smaller area probably take less attraction of
the operators, thus increase the chance of being undetected.
As discussed above, the necessary condition for an attack
area to be invisible is having a boundary of nodes with power
injection only. Since an FDI attack will modify the state
variables at various nodes, the involved measurements will be
altered accordingly. All these alterations must be ”assigned”
to some nodes around in order to avoid any unreasonable
4Figure 1: The FDI attack design scheme for distribution
network.
inconsistency. Nodes with no power injection can only adjust
by the changes in the power flow along the connected branch,
thus making the attack area larger. Meanwhile, nodes with
power injection (either incoming or outgoing) can justify any
change without further expanding the attack area by adjusting
the metered value of the local power injection. Algorithm 1
presents the entire process of identifying the attack area in a
distribution network.
There are two types of attack areas that exist within a
distribution network: (a1) attack area does not contain any
no-injection node, and (a2) attack area contains no-injection
node. Fig. 2 illustrates the general prototypes of these two
attack areas. Although the only feature that separates two
types of attack area is the existence of a node with power
injection, the attack design schemes are quite different. The
appearance of node with no power injection aggravates the
complexity of the design problem as various physical-law
based constraint equations must be formulated and solved. On
the other hand, the design process for an attack area without
no power injection node is more straightforward as it does
not require the solution of the set of nonlinear equations (11),
hence significantly reduce the amount of computations.
Algorithm 1: Finding FDI Attack Area for Distribution
Network
Input: All Zijabc of branch ij, Initial node k
Output: Area of Attack ΩA
1 Scanning all Zijabc
if (Zkiaa 6= 0) or (Zkibb 6= 0) or (Zkicc 6= 0) then
Add node k to ΩA
else
k++
end if
2 Scanning ΩA:
if (typeofnode(i) = injection) then
Move to the next node in ΩA
else
Back to 1
end if
(a) Attack area does not contain no-injection node.
(b) Attack area contains node j as a no-injection node.
Figure 2: Two types of attack area exist in distribution network
2) FDI Attack Model: From the set of nodes inside an
attack area ΩA, we can calculate the number of changeable
state variables. For every node in each phase, there are
two accompanied state variables, voltage magnitude V phi and
voltage angle θphi . However, all the nodes on the boundary of
the attack area must be removed from the set. If these nodes are
also modified, the measurements on the connected branches,
outside the attack area, will be altered as well. This might
introduce inconsistencies that could be detected. Furthermore,
there is a kind of state variable with predefined value that any
imposed adjustment will attract attention, for instance, voltage
magnitude and voltage angle of a slack bus. For that reason, the
attack should always avoid that type of nodes. The complete
5set of all changeable state variable can be obtained through
Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Identifying changeable state variables
Input: Area of Attack ΩA
Output: The set of changeable state variable SV
No. of SV n← 2× Sizeof(ΩA)
SV = {|V |j , θj |j ∈ ΩA}
while (j ∈ ΩA) do
if (type of node (j) = Slack) then
n = n - 2
Remove |V |j and θj
else if (type of node (j) = PV) then
n = n - 1
Remove |V |j
else
j++
end if
end while
If the attack area is (a1), the set of changeable state variable
are solely located at the initial node. Given the omission of
no power injection node, the attack design here goes straight
to the stage of computing the set of false data. A new
pseudo steady state is created, then all the new measurements
are calculated accordingly. Any change on the branches are
adjusted by means of changing the measured value of power
injections at the local as well as the adjacent nodes.
Dealing with (a2)-type attack area is a bit more complicated
as it requires more effort to apply the nonlinear constraint-
based attack model to find the set of manipulated state
variables. The model is represented by a set of constraint
equations that has the basis in the law of Conservation of
Energy. In order to launch an ideal stealthy FDI attack on a
predefined attack area ΩA, all possible alterations must happen
locally. It means that all power exchanges with the outside
regions must be kept unchanged in order to maintain the
seamlessly transition between the attack area and the rest of
the grid. In addition, the characteristic of no power injection
node must also be guaranteed. These requirements are satisfied
by following the two rules below:
• Algebraic sum of all power flows at a no power injection
node must be equal to zero. By complying with this
condition, the relationships that constitutes the h function
in (4) are preserved.
• Regarding the attack area, the sum of all changes in
every branches plus the sum of all injection variations
must be equal to zero. By complying with this condition,
the consistencies between powers inside and outside the
attack area are preserved.
Given the set of no power injection node is ΩA0, the
constraint-based FDI attack model is constructed as:∑
j∈ΩA0
zˆphjk (xˆ1, x2) = 0∑
j∈ΩA0
∆zˆphj (xˆ1, x2) +
∑
i,j∈ΩA
∆zˆphLij(xˆ1, x2) = 0
(11)
As per-phase analysis is conducted, each rule must be com-
posed for every phase in the attack coverage. In a same
manner, a new pseudo steady state is created by an initial-
ization, then this attack model outputs the manipulated state
variables to compute the malicious measurements. By keeping
the state variables at boundary unchanged, all the alterations
are held inside the attack area. The changes of measurements
on branches in the attack region (Pij , Qij) will be justified
by changing the measured values of the power injections at
all power injection nodes. The active and reactive power flows
are calculated by Eqs. (2) and (3), for all the phases in order
to update the new meters’ values.
The explanations of related quantities, superscripts and
subscripts using in the above constraint-based attack model
are provided below:
• P phijo, Q
ph
ijo - Real and reactive power measured on phase
ph on branch from node i to node j that we obtained from
load flow result (denoted by “o”).
• P phijn, Q
ph
ijn - Real and reactive power measured on phase
ph on branch from node i to node j that has been changed
due to new state variables applied at one or both terminals
of the branch (denoted by “n”).
• P phio , Q
ph
io - Real and reactive power injection measured
on phase ph at node i that we obtained from load flow
result (denoted by “o”).
• P phin , Q
ph
in - Real and reactive power injection measured
on phase ph at node i that has been changed due to new
state variables applied at terminal (denoted by “n”).
• P phLijo, Q
ph
Lijo - Power flow losses of phase ph on branch
ij that we obtained from load flow result, (P phLijo = P
ph
ijo+
P phjio, Q
ph
Lijo = Q
ph
ijo +Q
ph
jio).
• P phLijn, Q
ph
Lijn - Power flow losses of phase ph on branch ij
that has been changed due to new state variables applied
at one or both terminals of the branch, (P phLijn = P
ph
ijn +
P phjin, Q
ph
Lijn = Q
ph
ijn +Q
ph
jin).
C. Assessment method
As in the discussion above, the DNSE will be implemented
to satisfy the rising demand for real-time system monitoring of
the distributed smart grid. The adoption of DNSE is currently
at a much lower level compared with the corresponding
package for transmission system. Various prestigious power-
oriented software vendors, such as DIgSILENT [14], only
provide customer with a balanced-only SE module. In order
to overcome this limitation, a dedicated assessment process
is devised in this project. The foundation of this assessment
method is the consistency between the SE results and the
load flow results. The FDI attack model generates a set
of measurements that, in turn, will create a pseudo steady
state that the state estimation routine considers as a genuine
operating point. Thus, an FDI attack will completely bypass
the bad data detection process if its loading values can generate
the load flow results that match perfectly with the falsified
values. A simulation tool from DIgSILENT, PowerFactory,
which is well-known for its capability of providing a com-
prehensive unbalanced load flow result, is selected to detect
the designed attack. Fig. 3 illustrates the general idea of the
6detection process. The details are sequentially presented below.
Subscript 1 is used for manipulated values (quantities within
the attack area) and subsript 2 for unchanged values (quantities
outside the attack area) as in Section II-A.
Figure 3: The flow chart of the assessment method that works
similar to an unbalanced DNSE.
1) Acquiring steady-state values from load flow, denoted
by script 0: These include steady-state measurements z0 =
{PI0,PF0}, and steady-state variables x0 = {SV0}, which
will be used as the input to the attack design process. PI is
the power injection at nodes, either injected into (generated)
or drawn from (consumed) a node. PF is the power flow
measurement (Pij or Qij), indicating the algebraic power
flows at the two terminals of each branch in the network (lines,
transformers etc.). SV is the state variable (voltage magnitude
or voltage angle).
2) False data generation: Feeding the steady-state sets
{z0, x0} into the attack design scheme, we obtained attack
design results:
zˆ = z1 + z2 = (PF1 +PF2) + (PI1 +PI2)
xˆ = x1 + x2 = (SV1 + SV2)
(12)
3) Extracting the set of power injection PI and then in-
putting as the set of demands for the unbalanced load flow
program: The set of power injection includes loading profile
of the pseudo steady-state. Running the unbalanced load flow
with such input will produce the results of pseudo steady-
state measurements zn = {PIn,PFn}, and pseudo steady-
state state variables xn = {SVn}.
4) Conducting element-by-element comparisons then draw-
ing conclusion: Each corresponding element of the two couple
sets {zˆ, zn}, {xˆ, xn} will be compared. Based on our obser-
vations from the experimental result for the case of 1-phase
equivalent transmission system, the maximum mismatches are
always smaller than 1%. If ALL the comparisons produce the
results that are less than this threshold, it is reasonable to
conclude that the zˆ set will definitely bypass the BDD of SE
module.
III. CASE STUDY
The IEEE 13-node Test Feeder (Fig. 4) is chosen as the test
system following the recommendation from the Test Feeder
Working Group of the IEEE’s Distribution System Analysis
Subcommittee [15] for a task related to state estimation. It has
11 overhead lines and underground cables with seven different
configurations for various 1-, 2-, or 3-phase laterals. This
system load is diverse and unbalanced. In this investigation,
for the sake of simplicity at early stage of work, the distributed
load along the line from node 632 to node 671 is disabled. The
nominal voltage of this distribution network is 4.16 kV line-
to-line or 2400 V line-to-neutral. All the meter readings and
pre-attack state variables are collected from the unbalanced
load flow results with the default load profile.
In this section, a case study of the IEEE 13-node Test Feeder
is investigated and presented following the order of the pro-
posed attack design scheme. For convenience in representing
various quantities, all the nodes will be assigned to new aliases
as in Table I (these aliases are also indicated in Fig. 4).
Node New Name Node New Name
650H 01 650L 02
632 03 645 04
646 05 633 06
634 07 671 08
692 09 675 10
684 11 652 12
611 13 680 14
Table I: Aliases of nodes in the IEEE 13-node Test Feeder.
7Figure 4: The IEEE 13-node Test Feeder.
A. Attack area
Adopting the Algorithm 1, several feasible attack areas are
found from the IEEE 13-node system:
• ΩA1 = {13c, 12a, 11ac, 08ac, launching on either 13c or
12a}. It is categorized as (a2)-type attack area.
• ΩA2 = {04bc, 05bc, launching on 05}. It is categorized
as (a1)-type attack area.
• ΩA3 = {10abc, 09ac, 08b, launching on 10}. It is catego-
rized as (a1)-type attack area.
• ΩA4 = {01bc, 02bc, 03bc, 04bc, 05bc, 06bc, 08bc, launch-
ing on 04}. It is categorized as (a2)-type attack area.
When it comes to the size of attack area, it is apparently that
launching an FDI attack on ΩA4 requires much substantial
resource than a similar action for ΩA1. Therefore, ΩA1 will
be chosen to illustrate the next steps of the design scheme for
(a2)-type attack area. For the case of (a1)-type attack area,
ΩA3 almost resembles ΩA2 except it has more phases and is a
bit larger since the lack of power injection at node 09b gives
rise to an expansion towards node 08b. In fact, the branch 08-
09 is merely a switch, so all the corresponding state variables
are identical (as shown in Fig. 5). Thus, working on attack area
ΩA3 is considered as a more general case for investigation.
B. Constructing the constraint-based FDI attack model
1) (a1)-type Attack Area ΩA3: In the traditional distribution
network where radial structure dominates, the attack area
type of (a1) is omnipresent. The FDI attack here is launched
by arbitrarily changing one or several state variables at the
initial node while keeping all the other nodes around to be
unchanged. The number of changeable state variables at one
node is up to six (three voltage magnitudes and three voltage
angles for three phases). For the case of attack area ΩA3,
we can choose from the set {V a10, V b10, V c10, θa10, θb10, θc10}.
Meanwhile, the set of state variable at nodes 08 and 09 must
be kept unchanged in order to avoid the expansion of attack
region.
After imposing one or several initial adjustments onto the
selected changeable state variables, the design process goes
straight towards the stage of computing malicious measure-
ments. One thing to bear in mind is that no matter how
many state variables at node 10 we change, the following
power flows must be calculated and then updated to the
corresponding meters: P a,b,c1009 , Q
a,b,c
1009, P
a,b,c
0910 , Q
a,b,c
0910. After
obtaining those malicious values, the power injections at nodes
can be calculated. As the load at node 09 has two phases a
and c only, the changes on the line of phase b must be justified
at node 08 instead.
2) (a2)-type Attack Area ΩA1: The full 3-phase diagram of
an (a2)-type attack area ΩA1 is illustrated in Fig. 6. In order
to keep all the changes happened only inside the attack area,
all the state variables at node 08 must be kept unchanged.
Consequently, there are 8 changeable state variables within
the attack area ΩA1:
SV = {V a11, V c11, V a12, V c13, θa11, θc11, θa12, θc13} (13)
Since the attack area ΩA1 possess only one no-injection node,
11, and it has only two phase (a and c), the number of no-
injection constraint equation related to this node is 4.
• The sum of active power flows of phase a:∑
P a11 = 0⇔ P a1108n + P a1112n = 0 (14)
• The sum of reactive power flows of phase a:∑
Qa11 = 0⇔ Qa1108n +Qa1112n = 0 (15)
• The sum of active power flows of phase c:∑
P c11 = 0⇔ P c1108n + P c1113n = 0 (16)
• The sum of reactive power flows of phase c:∑
Qc11 = 0⇔ Qc1108n +Qc1113n = 0 (17)
Next, we need to identify the constraint equations related to
changes in power injection at nodes and changes in power loss
on branches. For the current attack area ΩA1, four constraint
equations of this type will be formed:
• The sum of all changes in active-related quantities for
phase a must equal to 0 :
(P a12n − P a12o) + (P a08n − P a08o)
+ (P aL0811n − P aL0811o) + (P aL1112n − P aL1112o) = 0
(18)
• The sum of changes in reactive-related quantities for
phase a must equal to 0 :
(Qa12n −Qa12o) + (Qa08n −Qa08o)
+ (QaL0811n −QaL0811o) + (QaL1112n −QaL1112o) = 0
(19)
• The sum of changes in active-related quantities for phase
c must equal to 0:
(P c13n − P c13o) + (P c08n − P c08o)
+ (P cL0811n − P cL0811o) + (P cL1113n − P cL1113o) = 0
(20)
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Figure 6: The full 3-phase diagram of attack area ΩA1.
• The sum of changes in reactive-related quantities for
phase c must equal to 0 :
(Qc13n −Qc13o) + (Qc08n −Qc08o)
+ (QcL0811n −QcL0811o) + (QcL1113n −QcL1113o) = 0
(21)
In total, the attack model has 8 constraint equations in
companion with 8 changeable state variables. At the first sight,
it seems that we would have an overdetermined problem to
solve because the proposed design scheme requires to devote
one state variable for initialization. However, the detailed
analysis of the set of constraint equations has shown a different
result. First, we have P a12 = −P a1211.
Next, we will delve deeper into the last four constraint
equations in order to reveal their true forms. As observed
from the detailed 3-phase diagram in Fig. 6, the circuit of
phase c including {08, 11, 13} and the circuit of phase
a including {08, 11, 12} are identical. In each circuit of
phase, the equations relevant to active and reactive power are
corresponding. Therefore, we just only need to investigate one
and then obtain the similar results for the rest.
Consider (18), we already have P a12n = −P a1211n and
P a12o = −P a1211o. Next, we focus on the region around node
08-09 (that is extracted and illustrated as in Fig. 7) and obtain
the following relationship: P a08+P
a
09+P
a
0811+P
a
0803+P
a
0910 =
0
Figure 7: Region around node 08-09.
As we determine to keep the state variables at 03, 08-09,
and 10 unchanged, the two power flows P a0803 and P
a
0910 will
be unchanged accordingly. Consequently, any change in power
injection P a08 will be reflected on (P
a
09 +P
a
0811). Let’s suppose
to keep the metered value of load at node 09, P a09, to be
unchanged then all the changes in P a08 will only reflected on
P a0811, thus: P
a
08n − P a08o = −P a0811n + P a0811o. Meanwhile,
the branches’ power losses are calculated by adding together
two opposite power flows from two terminals. We have
P aL0811n −P aL0811o = P a0811n +P a1108n −P a0811o −P a1108o and
P aL1112n − P aL1112o = P a1112n + P a1211n − P a1112o − P a1211o.
Combining all the expressions, then eliminating terms with
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(P a1108n − P a1108o) + (P a1112n − P a1112o) = 0
⇒ (P a1108n + P a1112n)− (P a1108o + P a1112o) = 0
(22)
We already obtained the value of P a1108o+P
a
1112o from steady
state and it exactly equals to 0. Hence, the constraint equation
(18) becomes P a1108n +P
a
1112n = 0, or the constraint equation
(14). In conclusion, the requirement for unchanged power in
the attack area has already been fulfilled by the requirement for
energy conservation at zero-injection node. Also, applying the
same procedure as above, the constraint equations (19), (20),
and (21) all have reduced forms resemble to the constraint
equations (15), (16), and (17). Consequently, there are only
four constraint equations (14)-(17) for this attack area.
At this point, there are four constraint equations and eight
changeable state variables. Thus, we can launch an attack
by initializing an adjustment on a state variable arbitrarily,
keeping three others to be unchanged, and then formulating
the four constraint equations with the rest four state variables.
The problem of designing an FDI attack now requires solving
a set of four nonlinear constraint equations for four unknowns.
To illustrate the process, we will choose voltage angle of phase
a at node 12, θa12, as the initial point to launch an attack. In
addition, three state variables will be kept unchanged are V a11,
V c11, and θ
c
11. Finally, we have to solve a set of constraint
equations {(14)-(17)} for four unknowns {V a12, V c13, θa11, θc13}.
Before generating the set of manipulated state variables, a
care must be taken to guarantee the correctness of results.
Therefore, we must examine the result of steady state first. It
means that we will launch an attack with an initial adjustment
amount of zero to the state variable θa12. As the solving
process for the set of constraint equations yielded a set of
state variables that matches exactly with the steady state values
gathered from running load flow program, it is certain that the
set of constraint equations is formed appropriately.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The outcomes of the attack model in the previous section
are the sets of manipulated state variables which are used
to compute malicious measurements. These sets of malicious
measurements are then fed into the dedicated Assessment
Method (discussed in Section II-C), yielding various exper-
imental results as presented below.
A. Attack area ΩA3
Several experiments are conducted with various small al-
terations to state variables at node 10. Using the proposed
assessment procedure, very small differences between the
calculated values and the simulation results are achieved.
Fig. 8 provides some insight about the average differences
(in percentage) between values acquired from attack design
scheme and their corresponding results obtained from the
assessment procedure. In general, the gaps normally fall in
the region from 0.035% to 0.06%, which is small enough
to negate any dissimilarity. As the loading values from the
attack design process can recreate the steady state with a
consistent load flow results, the set of malicious measurements
is able to gain a ”good” reputation from the viewpoint of the
SE’s BDD module. The detection rate is 0% since the BDD
fails to uncover all the injected malicious measurements. In
additionl, because 100% of these measurements are recognized
as normal, the false positive rate is firmly 100%.
Figure 8: Differences (in percentage) between the state vari-
ables obtained from attack design process and from the as-
sessment procedure using PowerFactory 2017.
B. Attack area ΩA1
As the validation process with zero initialization for the
constraint-based FDI attack model is accomplished, an attack
is now ready to be launched. Extending the work from the
Case Study, let’s assume the initializing amount on θa12 is +0.1
degree. In practice, the adversaries can prepare for various
of different attack cases corresponding to a range of initial
values. From such pool of attack cases, a scenario that provides
them with the best benefit and economical advantage may be
chosen. With the FDI attack model is constructed and solved
using MATLAB, we obtain the set of state variables during
the attack state as in Table II.
State Var Steady State Attack State
θa12 -5.066 deg -4.966 deg
V a12 2.3537 kV/0.9800 pu 2.3549 kV/0.9805 pu
V c12 2.3657 kV/0.9850 pu 2.3654 kV/0.9848 pu
θa11 -5.154 deg -5.122 deg
θc13 116.517 deg 116.518 deg
Table II: Comparing state variables from steady state and
attack state.
Due to a slight adjustment of +0.1 degree applied for θa12,
the values of various state variables are altered accordingly.
Although most of changes are minuscule, the gaps between
steady state values and attack values are significant, as shown
in the second and the third columns of Table III. However,
the most important concern is the mismatch between the
attack design results and the experimental values obtained
from the simulation. Based on the empirical data of SE results
for the balanced 1-phase equivalent model under attack, the
differences between two individual corresponding member
never surpass 1%. In this case, as indicated by the last column
of Table III, the absolute values of difference in percentage are
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Measurement Steady State Attack PF2017 % Diff
Pa1108 (kW) -123.81 -103.03 -103.03 ∼0
Pa1112 (kW) 123.81 103.03 103.03 ∼0
Qa1108 (kVAr) -82.84 -105.30 -105.23 0.067
Qa1112 (kVAr) 82.84 105.30 105.23 0.067
P c1108 (kW) -167.83 -172.62 -172.61 0.006
P c1113 (kW) 167.83 172.62 172.61 0.006
Qc1108 (kVAr) 17.83 11.26 11.29 -0.266
Qc1113 (kVAr) -17.83 -11.26 -11.29 -0.266
Pa1211 (kW) -122.93 -102.17 -102.17 ∼0
Pa0811 (kW) 124.02 103.25 103.25 ∼0
Qa1211 (kVAr) -82.59 -104.99 -104.99 ∼0
Qa0811 (kVAr) 83.05 105.49 105.41 0.076
P c1311 (kW) -167.45 -172.21 -172.21 ∼0
P c0811 (kW) 168.21 172.99 172.98 0.006
Qc1311 (kVAr) 18.22 11.67 11.70 -0.257
Qc0811 (kVAr) -17.58 -10.98 -11.01 -0.273
Pa12 (kW) 122.93 102.17 102.17 ∼0
Qa12 (kVAr) 82.59 104.99 104.99 ∼0
P c13 (kW) 167.45 172.21 172.21 ∼0
Qc13 (kVAr) 78.80 85.32 85.32 ∼0
QCap13 (kVAr) -97.00 -96.99 -97.00 -0.01
Pa08 (kW) 382.00 374.00 374.00 ∼0
Qa08 (kVAr) 204.00 173.02 173.00 0.012
P c08 (kW) 375.00 366.00 366.00 ∼0
Qc08 (kVAr) 217.00 229.00 229.00 ∼0
Table III: Comparisons of the steady state measurements,
the malicious measurements due to an FDI attack, and the
simulation results.
all below 0.3%. These evidences confirm that the proposed
attack design scheme is able to bypass the BDD of the SE
module as we achieve the detection rate of 0% and the false
positive rate of 100% again. In addition, the large deviations
between the attacked and the steady state power flows might
affect the control actions of the operators, possibly result in
incorrect decisions. Consequently, the physical domain could
lose its stability or even falling into collapse because of such
decisions.
V. CONCLUSION
Anticipating the widely deployment of the State Estimation
package for the emerging smart distribution network with
integrated energy resources, this paper focuses on one of the
utmost cyber-security threat, the False Data Injection attack.
A comprehensive investigation of constraint-based FDI attack
scheme is presented to demonstrate its feasibility and stealthy
characteristics. Firstly, a thorough review of all typical features
of distribution-level grid is discussed in order to emphasize
challenges one must take on to organize the attack. Next,
a detailed attack design scheme is proposed with special
consideration given to the naturally unbalanced characteristic
of the objective. An empirical-based dedicated assessment
procedure is also devised to validate the simulation results.
A case study with the IEEE-13 node Test Feeder is conducted
and examined to prove the correspondence between expected
and experimental results.
The success of this proposed attack design scheme has
posed a huge challenge to the future operation of smart grid
operators. It means that as long as an FDI attack is system-
atically elaborated (such that it can create a pseudo steady
state), all the contemporary data filtering mechanisms will
definitely fail to accomplish the assigned missions. Hence, it
is a crucial matter to build up a new detection method that has
capability to handle this kind of threat. Therefore, one of our
future priority work focuses is about a new detection method.
In addition, the investigation of attack must be expanded to
various alternative scenarios, e.g, when the adversaries have
limited attack resources or have no privilege to approach the
control center. Such case studies will enhance the knowledge
about threats in cyber-physical system, thus greatly contribute
to improve the system’s security.
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